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1999-2000, empirical evidence to support this mechanism can be obtained: First, the 
skill wage premium is lower [higher] in industries with longer [shorter] production 
chains. Second, the skill wage premium is lower [higher] in industries with a higher 
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1. Introduction 
The pattern of skill distribution varies significantly across industries. For 
instance, Figure 1, which presents the educational attainment of workers across 42 
industries in India in 1999-2000, supports this claim. Why do we observe different skill 
distribution patterns across industries? By utilizing Indian household survey data, this 
paper aims to empirically answer this question by examining the linkage among 
industry technological characteristics, industry-specific skill wage premium, and skill 
distribution patterns across industries. It is hypothesized that the length of industry 
production chains and the proportion of low-skilled workers involved across the chains 
are both negatively correlated with industry-specific skill wage premium. This is 
because as the length of production chains becomes longer, the negative effects on 
non-labor input quality caused by either low-skilled workers or poor infrastructure 
accumulate and become larger. The larger proportion of low-skilled workers involved in 
the chains further magnifies the damage accumulation. Then, it is assumed that the 
wages of high-skilled workers are dragged down more (i.e. skill wage premium is 
relatively low) in industries where non-labor input quality is worse due to defect 
accumulation. In consequence, high-skilled workers tend to be sorted into industries 
where they can enjoy higher skill wage premium by being matched with high-quality 
non-labor input.  
The main contribution of this paper is to propose another factor (in particular, 
the length of industry production chains which is a proxy for the quality of non-labor 
inputs) that explains the inter-industry wage differentials (inter-industry differences in 
skill wage premium, in particular) and the different patterns of skill allocation across 
industries. To my knowledge, none of the previous studies have proposed this 
mechanism. Although a formal economic model is not presented in the current paper 
and constructing it is left for future research, this paper provides empirical evidence to 
support the proposed mechanism.  
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The idea of this paper is closely related with that of Sampson (2011), which 
develops an assignment model of skill across sectors. In his model, high-skilled workers 
are sorted into industries which utilize non-labor inputs with higher productivity so that 
they can best leverage their talent. He also empirically confirms that falls in the price of 
capital (i.e. productivity increase of non-labor input) utilized by the industry positively 
affect the growth in industry average wage, which is a proxy for industry skill level. The 
current paper differs from his paper in three ways: First, his model assumes that 
production function is log-submodular exhibiting substitutability between labor and 
non-labor inputs, and quantity of non-labor inputs is endogenously chosen so that 
high-skilled workers can best utilize their ability by working with larger quantities of 
non-labor inputs. In contrast, I assume that the production function exhibits 
complementarity between labor and non-labor inputs, and each worker must work with 
the same quantity of non-labor inputs of different quality levels (or quality-adjusted 
productivity levels).1 Second, Sampson (2011) assumes that productivity of non-labor 
input changes due to exogenous technological progress. By contrast, I assume that 
quality-adjusted productivity of non-labor input is determined by the length of 
production chains and the degree of low-skilled labor’s involvement, assuming defect 
accumulation over sequential production. Finally, Sampson (2011) empirically 
examines the relationship between productivity of non-labor input and skill sorting by 
utilizing the industry average wage data assuming that they proxy industry skill level. 
This proximity is somewhat crude, as Sampson himself already recognizes. By utilizing 
within-industry data on workers’ skill distribution, the current paper links non-labor 
input quality and skill sorting across industries by empirically examining the association 
between non-labor input quality and industry-specific skill wage premium.  
This paper also contributes to the literature on industry wage premium. As 
                                                  
1 In his paper, Sampson indicates that if the production function is supermodular, which exhibits 
complementarity, and the quantity ratio between labor and non-labor inputs is fixed, positive 
assortative matching between high-skilled labor and high-quality non-labor inputs would occur, as 
hypothesized in the current paper. 
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Dickens and Katz (1987) compactly summarizes, previous studies try to explain the 
reason for the persistent inter-industry wage differences, which still remain after 
controlling observable individual characteristics, based on either competitive or 
non-competitive labor market models. From the competitive labor market model, the 
difference in industry wage premium is explained either by the variation in unobserved 
worker ability (Murphy and Topel 1987; Keane 1993; Abowd et al. 1999; Goux and 
Maurin 1999; Carruth et al. 2004), or by the differences in unobserved working 
conditions across industries. 2  From the non-competitive labor market model, the 
inter-industry wage differentials are explained by the efficiency wage model (Krueger 
and Summers 1988), the union-threat model (Dickens 1986), and the degree of trade 
protection/liberalization (Pavcnik et al. 2004; Goldberg and Pavcnik 2005; Dutta 2007; 
Lundin and Yun 2009). Part of the inter-industry wage differentials can also be 
explained by the different returns to skill across industries. For example, Robbins and 
Minowa (1996) and Pavcnik et al. (2004) find substantial variation in skill wage 
premium across industries in Brazil. Those papers claim that the returns to schooling 
can vary across industries either because workers with different education level might 
differ in the degree of labor market mobility, monitoring costs in the efficiency wage 
models, accumulation of industry-specific skills, or ability to bargain over wages. By 
contrast, my focus in this paper is on explaining the inter-industry skill wage 
differentials by the different quality of non-labor inputs which is proxied by the length 
of industry production chains.  
This paper also contributes to providing a presumable mechanism that explains 
the empirical evidence presented by Asuyama (2011). Asuyama (2011) empirically finds 
that a country with higher [lower] skill dispersion such as India [China] has higher 
exports in industries with shorter [longer] production chains, although the mechanism 
behind this is not empirically examined. The empirical findings of this paper function as 
                                                  
2  Murphy and Topel (1987) examine the association between the employment and earnings 
variability of the job and the inter-industry wage differentials, although they find little association.  
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favorable evidence for the skill sorting hypothesis rather than for the random matching 
hypothesis, both of which are considered possible in Asuyama (2011).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents three 
hypotheses to be empirically tested in this paper and explains the skill sorting 
mechanism across industries. Section 3 explains the empirical strategy. Section 4 
describes the data, and explains the construction of the key variables. Section 5 presents 
the estimation results. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Hypotheses and Skill Sorting Mechanism 
 This paper empirically tests the following three hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1. The skill wage premium is lower [higher] in industries with longer 
[shorter] production chains. 
Hypothesis 2. The skill wage premium is lower [higher] in industries with higher 
[lower] proportion of low-skilled workers who are engaged in production across 
the chains. 
Hypothesis 3. The proportion of high-skilled workers is larger in industries which 
pay higher skill premium, i.e. industries with shorter production chains and lower 
ratio of low-skilled workers involved across the chains (i.e., skill sorting trend). 
 The above hypotheses are derived based on the assumption that as the length of 
industry production chains becomes longer (or the number of production stages 
involved in order to produce final industry output increases), the quality of 
semi-finished intermediate input utilized by the industry tends to be worse because the 
involvement of low-skilled workers or poor-quality infrastructure (e.g. power and 
transportation) increases with the number of production stages. As in the O-ring 
production function proposed by Kremer (1993), the negative impact on the quality of 
intermediate input at each stage accumulates more as the length of production chains 
becomes longer. Clearly, the more low-skilled workers are involved across the chains, 
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the larger the accumulated negative effects on the quality of semi-finished intermediate 
input utilized by the industry become. It follows that high-skilled workers have more 
incentives to be sorted into industries with shorter production chains, where they can 
work with high-quality non-labor input. This is because I assume complementarity 
between labor and non-labor inputs, and thus marginal product and wage of high-skilled 
labor are dragged down more when working with low-quality non-labor inputs. In other 
words, since skill-wage premium is larger in industries which utilize higher-quality 
non-labor input, i.e. industries with shorter production chains and lower proportion of 
low-skilled workers involved, high-skilled workers are sorted into those industries.  
This sorting mechanism is similar to that of Grossman (2004), where 
high-skilled workers are sorted into industries (e.g. software) in which an individual’s 
contribution to the firm output can be measured perfectly and wages are paid according 
to their own productivity. In his model, high-skilled workers are disinclined to enter the 
industry characterized by team-production (e.g. automobile industry) in which each 
worker’s contribution to the output is measured only imperfectly due to imperfect labor 
contracts. This is because the wages of high-skilled workers are dragged down by the 
low-skilled team members and become lower than the counterparts in the software 
industry. Instead of the imperfect labor contract, in the current paper the quality of 
non-labor semi-finished intermediate input depresses skill-wage premium.  
Finally, it is assumed that inter-industry labor mobility is costly so that perfect 
skill sorting does not occur in reality. In consequence, one can simultaneously observe 
inter-industry skill wage differentials on one hand and skill-sorting trend on the other 
hand. In fact, as illustrated in Figure 1, in India each industry employs both low- and 
high-skilled workers, although their ratio differs substantially. The inter-industry labor 
mobility also seems low in the Indian sample in this study. Only 1.0% of the Indian 
workers (male, aged 15-65, full-time, regular wage/salaried workers examined in the 
empirical analysis) changed their industry (in terms of two-digit NIC-1998 level) during 
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the two years before the date of survey.3 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
In order to test Hypothesis 1, I estimate the following equation:  
ijijiij ZXEduLeontiefEduWage εδγβα ++++= **ln 1 , (1) 
where denotes the logarithm of wage of individual i in industry j; 
is an interaction term between , which is the skill level of 
individual i (estimated years of education in the current paper), and , which 
indicates the length of production chains in industry j; denotes interaction 
terms between  and other industry- or individual-specific variables; Z consists of 
a set of individual characteristics including industry affiliation dummies. The industry 
affiliation dummies absorb all the average impact of industry affiliation on wages, 
which is explicitly decomposed into various factors in the previous studies on the 
industry-wage premium. In this paper, my focus is on
ijWageln
jLeontiefiEdu * iEdu
1
jLeontief
XEdui *
iEdu
β , which captures the extent to 
which skill wage premium varies according to the length of the industry’s production 
chains. If the estimated coefficient 1β  is significantly negative, it supports Hypothesis 
1.  
 Second, in order to test Hypothesis 2, an interaction term, s 
added to equation (1) as follows: 
ji LowEduEdu *  i
ijijijiij ZXEduLowEduEduLeontiefEduWage εδγββα ′+′+′+′+′+′= ***ln 21 , (2) 
where represents the proportion of low-skilled workers who are involved in 
production activities across the production chains of industry j. If both Hypotheses 1 
and 2 are correct, we can expect that both 
jLowEdu
1β ′  and 2β ′  turn out to be negative.  
 Finally, Hypothesis 3 is simply tested by the following equation:  
jjjj LowEduLeontiefHighEdu εββα ′′+′′+′′+′′= 21 , (3) 
where indicates the proportion of high-skilled workers working within jHighEdu
                                                  
3 There are 60 industry categories based on two-digit NIC-1998 code. 
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industry j. Hypothesis 3 is confirmed when the estimated coefficients 1β ′′  and 2β ′′ are 
both negative. 
 
4. Data 
This section summarizes the data used in the empirical analysis. More detailed 
explanations on data are provided in Appendix I.  
It is expected that as the spread of workers’ skills becomes greater, negative 
impacts on non-labor input quality caused by low-skilled workers become larger and 
high-skilled workers have more incentives to be sorted into industries with shorter 
production chains. Thus, stronger evidence to confirm the three hypotheses can be 
found by examining a country with a greater spread of skill. As such a country, I choose 
India. Skill distribution in India is characterized by a large number of illiterate 
populations and relatively large proportion of highly-educated individuals. As of 
2004/05, the share of employed people who were illiterate or had only education below 
the primary level was 50%, while that of upper secondary and post-secondary education 
was 21% (15% and 6%, respectively). India’s skill distribution is very unequal 
compared with other developing countries, such as China, where the proportion of 
workers who had received no schooling and those with post-lower secondary education 
was 8% and 19% respectively in 2005.4  
Data on wage, education level, and other individual characteristics are 
extracted from the unit-level data of the Employment and Unemployment schedule of 
the National Sample Survey conducted in 1999-2000 (NSS 1999). The NSS 1999 
covers 165,244 households with 819,013 persons across India. As Kijima (2006) states, 
the Employment and Unemployment schedule of the NSS is the only survey which 
collects information on individual’s earnings and characteristics for the entire country 
                                                  
4 Figures on workers’ skill distribution of India and China are computed from NSSO, Unit-level 
data of National Sample Survey (NSS), Employment and Unemployment schedule, 2004-05, and 
China’s 2005 National 1% Population Sample Survey (SC and NBS, 2007). India’s figures are 
computed based on the usual principal activity status. 
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through stratified random sampling procedure. The Employment and Unemployment 
schedule of the NSS was also conducted in 1972-73, 1977-78, 1983, 1987-88, 1993-94, 
and 2004-05. However, for the preliminary analysis conducted here, only 1999 data are 
used.5  
I restrict the sample to male, prime-age (15-65 years), regular salaried/wage 
employees who have worked at least 5 days at their main economic activity during the 
reference week.  is defined as the logarithm of weekly wage and salary 
earnings (either in cash or in kind, including bonus and perquisites) for the main 
economic activity.  
ijWageln
jLeontief , which indicates the length of production chains in industry j, is the 
column sum of the Leontief inverse coefficient of each industry computed from the 
input-output (IO) table of India 1998-99 (CSO 2005), as follows: 
∑= k kjj leonLeontief , 
where  is the Leontief inverse coefficient in cell kj. Subscripts k and j denote row 
and column of the IO table, respectively.  measures how many units of 
domestic inputs industry j requires, both directly and indirectly, to produce one unit of 
output in industry j. I use this  as a proxy for the length of the production 
chains of industry j.
kjleon
jLeontief
jLeontief
6 It should be noted that only domestic inputs are used, as explained 
in Appendix I, since the quality of imported input is assumed to be relatively good and 
is not likely to be affected much especially by the domestic low-skilled workers. 
As , three variables ( , , and ) are constructed. 
 is defined as the percentage of low-skilled workers (i.e. illiterate workers and 
literate workers without formal schooling or with below primary-level education), who 
jLowEdu jbpleon jbpwin jbpbtw
jbpleon
                                                  
5 The 1999 dataset has some advantages compared with the other rounds. It contains some important 
variables which were not asked in the former rounds (e.g. number of workers in the enterprise for 
which an individual is working). Using the data from NSS 2004 may create a problem when 
matching with variables computed from the IO table of 2003-04, since the quality of those variables 
is likely to be worse as a result of estimating the import flow matrix of 2003-04 from the 1993 IO 
table. 
6 See Asuyama (2011) for a more detailed explanation of . jLeontief
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are involved across all the production chains of industry j which include both chains 
within industry j and those in other industries. It is computed as follows: 
∑= k jkjkj Leontiefleonbpwinbpleon )/*( , 
where  is the percentage of low-skilled people working within industry k, 
which is computed from NSS 1999.  is also constructed as follows:  
kbpwin
jbpbtw
∑ ≠ −= jk jjjkjkj leonLeontiefleonbpwinbpbtw )]/(*[  
The term  indicates the length of production chains (or the amount 
of input required) outside industry j. Thus,  represents the share of low-skilled 
workers who are involved in producing inputs (both directly and indirectly) outside 
industry j. It should be noted that all three  variables are constructed based 
on all working individuals including female, non-prime-age, part-time, casual and 
self-employed workers. 
)( jjj leonLeontief −
jbpbtw
LowEdu j
 In order to match the industry classifications of the IO table (115 industries) 
and those of NSS 1999 (5-digit NIC-1998 code), 42 industry categories are constructed 
as presented in Appendix II. The constructed key variables, , , , 
and  for the 42 industries are reported in Table 1.  tends to be longer 
in the manufacturing industries and shorter in the agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, 
and service industries. Since the Leontief inverse coefficient tends to be larger in cell jj, 
and show the similar trends. By contrast,  exhibits a different 
trend. For instance, the share of low-skilled workers in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and 
mining industries is much smaller in terms of  than in terms of and 
. It indicates that those industries employ the large proportion of low-skilled 
workers within their industry, but the skill level embodied in the non-labor input from 
other industries is not so low. 
jLeontief
jLeontief
jbpbtw
jbpleon jbpwin
jbpleon
jbpbtw
j
j
bpleon
bpwin
jbpwin
jbpbtw
A set of variables X includes the following industry-specific variables: the ratio 
of imported input to the total input; the ratio of imports of final goods to 
[output+import-export] which is an indicator for the degree of import competition; the 
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ratio of export to output; a set of dummy variables which indicate whether the industry 
is delicensed, not reserved for the public sector, and open to foreign direct investment 
(FDI) up to 51% equity or more. X also includes individual-specific dummy variables 
indicating whether the individual is employed temporarily, a member of a 
union/association, working for a public or semi-public firm, working for a small firm 
employing less than 10 workers. Z includes those individual-specific dummy variables, 
dummies for Muslim religion, social groups, household headedness, marital status, 
occupation, rural residence, and a set of State and industry affiliation dummies. Table 2 
presents the summary statistics for all the variables used in the regression analysis.  
 
5. Estimation Results  
Tables 3 and 4 report the regression results for estimation equations (1) and (2) 
which test Hypothesis 1 and 2. All estimations are obtained by weighted least squares 
regression by utilizing the survey weight of NSS 1999. The results in Table 4 restrict the 
sample to manufacturing and service industries by dropping four primary industries 
(agriculture; forestry and logging; fishing; mining and quarrying). This is because the 
quality-adjusted productivity of those primary industries is likely to be substantially 
affected by inputs such as land, weather, and natural resources, which are not included 
as inputs in the IO table and thus not captured by . Column (1) in both tables 
just adds an interaction term between  and  to the ordinary 
Mincer-type wage equation. Another interaction term between and  is 
added in column (2), and more interaction terms are controlled in column (3). In all 
those specifications in both tables, the coefficient on the interaction term between  
and is negative and statistically significant, as predicted by Hypothesis 1.  
jLeontief
iEdu jLeontief
Edui jbpleon
Edui
jLeontief
The coefficient on the interaction term between  and  is not 
statistically significant in all specifications except for column (3) of Table 4, in which 
the coefficient is slightly positive and statistically significant. This contradicts 
iEdu jbpleon
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Hypothesis 2 which predicts a negative coefficient on . In order to 
examine in more detail the effect of worker skill level embodied in the inputs on 
industry-specific education wage premium, column (4) decomposes the effect of the 
proportion of low-educated workers into that within industry j ( ) and that outside 
industry j ( ). In this specification, the coefficient on  is still 
significantly negative. Furthermore, it turns out that the share of low-skilled workers 
involved in producing inputs outside industry j ( ) negatively affects the 
education wage premium of industry j, as predicted by Hypothesis 2. By contrast, the 
effect of the share of low-skilled workers within industry j ( ) is either 
statistically insignificant (Table 3) or slightly but statistically significantly positive 
(Table 4). This positive association between within-industry higher percentages of 
low-skilled labor and higher skill wage premium is puzzling. It is necessary to check 
more carefully whether this result is robust by examining additional samples in future. 
ji LowEduEdu *
jbpwin
i LeontiefEdu *
jbpbtw
bpwin
jLeontief
jbpbtw j
j
Leontief
The negative impact of  on education premium is not negligible. If 
an individual moves to an industry with one larger  (for example, switch 
from Banking to Leather and leather product industry), the wage premium for one year 
schooling drops from 5.5% to 4.6%, even using the smallest negative estimate obtained 
in column (1) of Table 3.
jLeontief
jbpbtw
7 If we use the estimate of the largest negative estimate 
(column (4) of Table 4), the education premium drops from 17.0% to 14.7%. This 
means that an individual with university-level education with 16 year schooling earns 
28.6% point more at minimum (or 334.9% point more at maximum), ceteris paribus, if 
he works in the Banking industry rather than in the Leather and leather product 
industry.8 The negative impact of  is not as large as that of . The 
wage premium for one year schooling drops from 16.04% to 15.95% in Table 3, and 
from 17.02% to 16.87% in Table 4. As a result, the differences in wage premium for 16 
j
                                                  
7 5.5% = [exp(0.053)-1]*100. 4.6% = [exp(0.053-0.008)-1]*100 
8  The wage of an individual without schooling is set equal to 100 in both industries. 
28.6%=[(1+5.5/100)^16-(1+4.6/100)^16]*100. 334.9%=[(1+17.0/100)^16-(1+14.7/100)^16]*100. 
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year schooling between the Banking and Leather industries become 13.1% point and 
25.1% point, respectively.  
Apart from  and , whether individual i is temporarily 
employed, a member of a union/association, and working for a small firm; and whether 
this individual is working in an industry which faces higher import competition, utilizes 
a larger proportion of imported inputs, and is delicensed, all this is associated with 
lower education premium. In contrast, whether individual i is working for a public firm 
and working in an industry which is open to FDI is associated with higher education 
premium. 
jLeontief jbpbtw
As mentioned before, Figure 1 illustrates the educational attainment of the 
employed population across industries using the NSS 1999 data. It can be seen that the 
pattern of skill distribution varies significantly across industries. In order to formally 
test whether skill sorting is taking place as predicted by Hypothesis 3, equation (3) is 
estimated. Table 5 reports the estimation results. As , which indicates the 
proportion of high-skilled workers working within industry j, three variables are used: 
the percentage of workers with graduate and above education ( ), that with 
higher secondary and above education ( ), and that with secondary and above 
education ( ).
jHighEdu
jgradwin
ly assoc
jhswin
h High
can
jswin
9 The results in the upper panel utilize all industries, while those in 
the lower panel restrict samples to manufacturing and service industries. As expected, 
 is negatively associated wit j  in all specifications, although 
some estimates are not statistically signifi jLeontief  is larger by one, the 
percentage of high-skilled workers is 10-30% smaller when we only focus on the 
statistically significant estimates. jbpleon  is also negative iated with 
jHighEdu . However, it seems natural that the percentage of high-skilled workers 
( jHighEdu ) and that of low-skilled workers within industry j ( jbpwin ), which is part of 
jLeontief Edu
t. If 
                                                  
9 Note that upper-secondary (high school level) education in India is further divided into what is 
called “higher secondary” education (2 years) and “secondary” education (2 years). The 
lower-secondary (junior high school level) education is called “middle” education in India. 
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jbpleon , are negatively correlated. Th tea jpleon , jbpbtw  is added in 
s (7)-(9). jbpbtw  is also negatively d with jHighEdu , although the 
association is not statistically significa using jgradwin  as the dependent 
variable. One percentage point increase in the share of low-skilled worker who are 
involved in producing inputs outside industry j ( jbpbtw ) is associated with 1-2% 
decrease in the share of high-skilled workers in industry j. In sum, skill sorting 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) is confirmed in most
us, ins d of
 associate
nt when 
 b
 of the specifications. 
column
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has proposed a mechanism that links industry’s technological 
characteristics (i.e. quality of non-labor inputs), industry-specific skill wage premium, 
and skill sorting across industries. The quality of semi-finished non-labor input utilized 
in a certain industry is proxied by the length of production chains (or units of inputs 
required, either directly or indirectly, to produce an industry output). This is done by 
assuming that damage caused by low-skilled workers or poor infrastructure on input 
quality accumulates and becomes greater as the length of production chains becomes 
longer. The wages of high-skilled workers are dragged down more as the quality of 
non-labor input they work with becomes worse. In other words, skill wage premium 
becomes lower in industries which utilize low-quality non-labor input due to longer 
production chains and larger proportion of low-skilled workers involved across the 
chains. In consequence, skilled workers are sorted into those industries where they can 
receive higher skill-wage premium. In a real world where labor mobility is low, perfect 
skill sorting does not occur, and thus to some extent it is possible to observe both 
inter-industry skill wage differentials and skill sorting.  
By examining Indian wage and employment data for 1999-2000, this paper 
also has provided empirical evidence to support the above mechanism. First, it has 
found that the skill wage premium is lower [higher] in industries with longer [shorter] 
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production chains. Second, the skill wage premium is lower [higher] in industries with a 
higher [lower] proportion of low-skilled workers who are engaged in producing inputs 
outside their own industry. Third, the proportion of high-skilled workers is larger in 
industries with shorter production chains and lower ratio of low-skilled workers 
involved across the chains (i.e., a skill sorting trend is observable). 
Several areas are left for future research. First, constructing a formal economic 
model for the mechanism proposed in this paper is essential. Second, increasing 
samples by adding other NSS rounds or using a larger dataset that includes other 
countries would be useful to make the empirical evidence of this paper more robust. 
Third, utilizing hourly wage data is also preferable. Last, but not least, finding a more 
appropriate variable which proxies individual “skill” or “ability” is necessary, although 
this is a very hard task. In this paper, I measured skill wage premium by private returns 
to education. However, measurement errors are likely to exist since years of schooling 
are estimated using the highest education level attained. It is also highly possible that 
persons with the same years of schooling may possess different levels of skills or 
abilities and thus differ in their productivities. In that case, higher education wage 
premium in a certain industry may reflect the situation where workers who have higher 
ability among the same educated workers have been sorted into the industry and earn 
higher wages due to their high productivity. This would mean that the empirical results 
to confirm Hypotheses 1 and 2 in this paper just reflect the result of skill sorting 
(Hypothesis 3). Such ability differences may partly explain the existence of 
inter-industry education wage differentials. However, due to the low labor mobility in 
India, assuming the co-existence of inter-industry skill wage differentials (in terms of 
returns to true ability) and imperfect skill sorting seems more realistic and reasonable.   
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Figure 1 Educational Attainment of Employed Population by Industry 
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Notes: An individual is considered working based on the weekly activity status. For industry classification, see Appendix I.  
Source: NSSO, Unit-level data of National Sample Survey (NSS), Employment and Unemployment schedule, 1999-2000. 
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Table 1 Industry-specific Indices of Production-Chain Length and Low-skilled 
Worker Ratios 
Leontief (rank) bpleon (%) (rank) bpwin (%) (rank) bpbtw (%) (rank)
1 Agriculture 1.391 (34) 61.5 (2) 68.2 (3) 29.5 (27)
2 Forestry & logging 1.161 (41) 72.6 (1) 78.6 (1) 33.9 (17)
3 Fishing 1.227 (38) 61.4 (3) 67.1 (4) 34.1 (15)
4 Mining & quarrying 1.314 (36) 52.0 (6) 59.1 (7) 27.4 (32)
5 Food 1.914 (19) 45.4 (11) 43.4 (13) 48.1 (1)
6 Bevarage 1.946 (15) 45.5 (9) 50.4 (10) 40.1 (6)
7 Tobacco 1.884 (21) 59.2 (4) 73.2 (2) 41.3 (4)
8 Textile 2.157 (3) 41.9 (13) 47.4 (11) 35.2 (12)
9 Wearing apparel 2.247 (2) 32.5 (18) 26.5 (23) 37.4 (8)
10 Wooden furniture 1.772 (25) 37.6 (15) 35.3 (16) 41.1 (5)
11 Wood and wood products 1.710 (28) 53.8 (5) 61.0 (6) 42.2 (3)
12 Paper, paper products & newsprint 2.101 (5) 30.6 (20) 28.1 (22) 33.8 (19)
13 Printing & publishing 1.761 (27) 22.8 (29) 18.3 (28) 29.6 (26)
14 Leather footwear 2.073 (9) 39.5 (14) 45.5 (12) 33.8 (18)
15 Leather and leather products 2.312 (1) 34.3 (17) 33.4 (17) 35.5 (10)
16 Rubber products 2.128 (4) 26.0 (25) 17.1 (29) 34.3 (14)
17 Plastic products 1.960 (14) 21.3 (32) 14.0 (32) 29.8 (24)
18 Petroleum & coal tar products 1.501 (32) 24.6 (27) 18.8 (27) 36.7 (9)
19 Chemical products 1.942 (16) 31.8 (19) 31.6 (19) 32.2 (21)
20 Non-metallic mineral products 1.773 (23) 49.3 (7) 62.4 (5) 31.8 (22)
21 Iron and steel 2.090 (7) 21.8 (31) 16.9 (30) 29.7 (25)
22 Non-ferrous basic metals 1.679 (29) 27.4 (23) 26.5 (24) 28.7 (29)
23
Industrial machinery, machine tools,
fabricated metal products
1.925 (17) 25.7 (26) 26.0 (25) 25.3 (37)
24
Office computing machines, communication
equipment, electronic equipment (incl. TV)
1.764 (26) 13.3 (37) 5.2 (39) 24.7 (40)
25 Electrical industrial machinery 1.897 (20) 17.2 (36) 10.9 (36) 24.1 (41)
26 Electrical machinery and apparatus (wire,
cable, batteries, electric appliances)
1.772 (24) 19.9 (33) 15.1 (31) 26.4 (33)
27 Motor vehicles 2.092 (6) 18.9 (35) 12.1 (34) 26.1 (34)
28 Other transport equipment (excl. aircraft) 2.069 (10) 27.2 (24) 28.3 (21) 26.0 (35)
29 Miscellaneous manufacturing (incl. watches
and clocks, medical instruments, aircraft)
2.025 (12) 30.1 (21) 32.8 (18) 27.4 (31)
30 Construction 1.793 (22) 46.2 (8) 55.9 (8) 33.7 (20)
31 Electricity, gas and water 2.020 (13) 19.7 (34) 12.4 (33) 35.4 (11)
32 Transport (railway) 1.921 (18) 22.5 (30) 20.0 (26) 25.2 (39)
33 Transport (other), storage 1.614 (30) 34.8 (16) 39.2 (15) 28.0 (30)
34 Post & telecommunication 1.222 (39) 7.3 (42) 2.5 (40) 29.3 (28)
35 Trade (wholesale and retail) 1.235 (37) 29.9 (22) 30.9 (20) 25.3 (38)
36 Hotels and restaurants 2.025 (11) 45.5 (10) 43.4 (14) 47.6 (2)
37 Banking 1.315 (35) 8.7 (40) 2.3 (41) 35.0 (13)
38 Insurance 1.424 (33) 7.7 (41) 0.0 (42) 25.5 (36)
39 Education and research 1.183 (40) 9.6 (39) 5.3 (38) 34.0 (16)
40 Medical and health 2.081 (8) 24.0 (28) 9.1 (37) 37.7 (7)
41 Other services (RE, BusiServ, ComputerServ,
Renting, Community, Other)
1.516 (31) 44.5 (12) 50.6 (9) 31.7 (23)
42 Public administration , defence 1.000 (42) 11.5 (38) 11.5 (35)
Notes: For the definition of variables and industry classification, see Section 4 and Appendix.  
20 
 
Table 2 Summary Statistics for the Variables Used in the Regression Analyses 
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev.
wage Indian Rupee 998.9 952.5
age year 36.4 11.0
eduy year 9.2 5.0
leontief 1.499 0.392
bpleon % 27.8 15.6
bpbtw % 31.3 5.7
bpwin % 27.9 19.3
imported input % 11.12 11.18
import % 5.46 9.68
export % 6.46 10.18
delicensed dummy 0.999 0.036
private dummy 0.795 0.404
FDI dummy 0.507 0.500
muslim dummy 0.099 0.298
SG (ST) dummy 0.051 0.220
SG (SC) dummy 0.147 0.354
SG (OBC) dummy 0.294 0.456
SG (Other) dummy 0.508 0.500
household head dummy 0.713 0.453
married dummy 0.796 0.403
temporary dummy 0.281 0.450
union dummy 0.432 0.495
occ1 (professionals) dummy 0.051 0.219
occ2 (technicians) dummy 0.097 0.296
occ3 (govt admin & executive
officials)
dummy 0.011 0.103
occ4 (managers) dummy 0.022 0.146
occ5 (clerical) dummy 0.210 0.407
occ6 (sales) dummy 0.069 0.254
occ7 (service) dummy 0.106 0.308
occ8 (farmers etc.) dummy 0.050 0.218
occ9 (production related:
supervisors & foremen)
dummy 0.027 0.162
occ10 (production related: others) dummy 0.336 0.472
occ11 (not classified) dummy 0.022 0.147
public firm dummy 0.345 0.476
small firm dummy 0.326 0.469
rural dummy 0.373 0.484  
Notes: The number of observations is 24,955 for bpbtw, and 32,101 for the other variables. For the 
definition of variables, see Appendix I.  
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Table 3 Regression Results for Wage Equation (all industries) 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
age 0.042 (0.004) *** 0.042 (0.004) *** 0.044 (0.004) *** 0.046 (0.004) ***
age squared -0.0004 (0.000) *** -0.0004 (0.000) *** -0.0004 (0.000) *** -0.0004 (0.000) ***
eduy 0.053 (0.005) *** 0.053 (0.005) *** 0.120 (0.030) *** 0.149 (0.034) ***
eduy*leontief -0.008 (0.003) *** -0.009 (0.003) *** -0.014 (0.004) *** -0.013 (0.006) **
eduy*bpleon 0.0001 (0.000) 0.0001 (0.000)
eduy*bpbtw -0.001 (0.000) **
eduy*bpwin 0.00005 (0.000)
eduy*imported input 0.00002 (0.000) -0.0003 (0.000)
eduy*import -0.0003 (0.000) *** -0.0004 (0.000) ***
eduy*export 0.0001 (0.000) 0.0001 (0.000)
eduy*temporary -0.033 (0.003) *** -0.030 (0.003) ***
eduy*union -0.004 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003)
eduy*public firm 0.003 (0.003) -0.002 (0.003)
eduy*small firm -0.008 (0.003) *** -0.011 (0.003) ***
eduy*delicensed -0.055 (0.028) * -0.058 (0.029) **
eduy*private -0.001 (0.005) 0.001 (0.008)
eduy*FDI 0.014 (0.004) *** 0.015 (0.004) ***
muslim 0.015 (0.015) 0.016 (0.015) 0.004 (0.015) -0.0002 (0.017)
ST -0.037 (0.025) -0.037 (0.025) -0.036 (0.024) -0.050 (0.026) *
SC -0.061 (0.016) *** -0.061 (0.016) *** -0.056 (0.016) *** -0.040 (0.018) **
OBC -0.065 (0.012) *** -0.065 (0.012) *** -0.063 (0.012) *** -0.077 (0.012) ***
household head 0.104 (0.014) *** 0.104 (0.014) *** 0.097 (0.014) *** 0.095 (0.014) ***
married 0.061 (0.016) *** 0.061 (0.016) *** 0.052 (0.016) *** 0.045 (0.016) ***
temporary -0.215 (0.014) *** -0.215 (0.014) *** 0.046 (0.024) * 0.054 (0.025) **
union 0.192 (0.014) *** 0.192 (0.014) *** 0.225 (0.029) *** 0.244 (0.030) ***
occ1 (professionals) 0.576 (0.052) *** 0.571 (0.053) *** 0.504 (0.053) *** 0.534 (0.064) ***
occ2 (technicians) 0.380 (0.047) *** 0.374 (0.047) *** 0.326 (0.047) *** 0.332 (0.055) ***
occ3 (govt admin&exe) 0.556 (0.058) *** 0.552 (0.058) *** 0.480 (0.058) *** 0.596 (0.076) ***
occ4 (managers) 0.626 (0.067) *** 0.620 (0.067) *** 0.538 (0.068) *** 0.557 (0.076) ***
occ5 (clerical) 0.168 (0.040) *** 0.162 (0.042) *** 0.116 (0.042) *** 0.116 (0.048) **
occ6 (sales) 0.171 (0.047) *** 0.165 (0.048) *** 0.124 (0.049) ** 0.125 (0.053) **
occ7 (service) 0.114 (0.041) *** 0.108 (0.042) *** 0.073 (0.041) * 0.009 (0.048)
occ9 (prod. supervisors) 0.265 (0.046) *** 0.258 (0.046) *** 0.227 (0.046) *** 0.222 (0.052) ***
occ10 (prod. others) 0.199 (0.039) *** 0.192 (0.040) *** 0.151 (0.040) *** 0.139 (0.046) ***
occ11 (not classified) 0.312 (0.054) *** 0.305 (0.055) *** 0.251 (0.055) *** 0.245 (0.061) ***
public firm 0.217 (0.015) *** 0.216 (0.015) *** 0.179 (0.034) *** 0.264 (0.037) ***
small firm -0.186 (0.013) *** -0.186 (0.013) *** -0.112 (0.026) *** -0.077 (0.026) ***
rural -0.136 (0.013) *** -0.137 (0.014) *** -0.134 (0.013) *** -0.131 (0.012) ***
State dummies YES YES YES YES
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 32101 32101 32101 24955
R-squared 0.590 0.590 0.598 0.598
F-statistics 240.46 237.98 230.95 194.14
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of an individual’s weekly wage. All estimations are 
obtained by weighted least squares regression using the survey weight of NSS 1999. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, 
respectively. SG(Other) and occ8 (Farmers etc.) are omitted as reference categories. Public administration 
industry, for which bpbtw is not available, is not included in the estimation of column (4). For the 
definition of variables, see Appendix I. 
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Table 4 Regression Results for Wage Equation (manufacturing and service 
industries) 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
age 0.042 (0.004) *** 0.042 (0.004) *** 0.044 (0.004) *** 0.045 (0.004) ***
age squared -0.0004 (0.000) *** -0.0004 (0.000) *** -0.0004 (0.000) *** -0.0004 (0.000) ***
eduy 0.054 (0.005) *** 0.054 (0.005) *** 0.109 (0.030) *** 0.157 (0.035) ***
eduy*leontief -0.009 (0.003) *** -0.009 (0.004) ** -0.018 (0.005) *** -0.020 (0.007) ***
eduy*bpleon -0.00001 (0.000) 0.0004 (0.000) ***
eduy*bpbtw -0.001 (0.000) ***
eduy*bpwin 0.0004 (0.000) ***
eduy*imported input -0.0003 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) ***
eduy*import 0.0003 (0.000) 0.0003 (0.000)
eduy*export -0.0002 (0.000) -0.0003 (0.000)
eduy*temporary -0.032 (0.003) *** -0.029 (0.003) ***
eduy*union -0.008 (0.004) ** -0.006 (0.004)
eduy*public firm 0.006 (0.003) * 0.001 (0.003)
eduy*small firm -0.009 (0.003) *** -0.012 (0.003) ***
eduy*delicensed -0.041 (0.028) -0.042 (0.029)
eduy*private 0.004 (0.005) 0.010 (0.008)
eduy*FDI 0.006 (0.005) 0.007 (0.005)
muslim 0.009 (0.016) 0.009 (0.016) -0.003 (0.016) -0.009 (0.017)
ST -0.022 (0.027) -0.022 (0.027) -0.027 (0.026) -0.039 (0.030)
SC -0.075 (0.017) *** -0.075 (0.017) *** -0.072 (0.017) *** -0.056 (0.019) ***
OBC -0.062 (0.012) *** -0.062 (0.012) *** -0.061 (0.012) *** -0.075 (0.013) ***
household head 0.110 (0.014) *** 0.110 (0.014) *** 0.103 (0.014) *** 0.100 (0.015) ***
married 0.064 (0.017) *** 0.064 (0.017) *** 0.056 (0.017) *** 0.052 (0.017) ***
temporary -0.225 (0.014) *** -0.225 (0.014) *** 0.039 (0.027) 0.056 (0.027) **
union 0.196 (0.015) *** 0.196 (0.015) *** 0.278 (0.034) *** 0.307 (0.036) ***
occ1 (professionals) 0.400 (0.066) *** 0.400 (0.066) *** 0.351 (0.065) *** 0.324 (0.089) ***
occ2 (technicians) 0.198 (0.061) *** 0.198 (0.061) *** 0.169 (0.060) *** 0.116 (0.083)
occ3 (govt admin&exe) 0.375 (0.070) *** 0.375 (0.070) *** 0.325 (0.070) *** 0.392 (0.100) ***
occ4 (managers) 0.437 (0.079) *** 0.437 (0.079) *** 0.379 (0.079) *** 0.343 (0.100) ***
occ5 (clerical) -0.009 (0.057) -0.009 (0.058) -0.033 (0.057) -0.089 (0.079)
occ6 (sales) -0.0002 (0.063) -0.0001 (0.063) -0.022 (0.063) -0.075 (0.083)
occ7 (service) -0.053 (0.058) -0.053 (0.058) -0.065 (0.057) -0.178 (0.080) **
occ9 (prod. supervisors) 0.078 (0.062) 0.078 (0.062) 0.066 (0.060) 0.001 (0.082)
occ10 (prod. others) 0.017 (0.057) 0.017 (0.057) -0.005 (0.056) -0.072 (0.078)
occ11 (not classified) 0.092 (0.067) 0.092 (0.067) 0.065 (0.066) 0.005 (0.087)
public firm 0.213 (0.016) *** 0.213 (0.016) *** 0.147 (0.037) *** 0.238 (0.041) ***
small firm -0.182 (0.013) *** -0.182 (0.013) *** -0.099 (0.026) *** -0.054 (0.026) **
rural -0.138 (0.014) *** -0.138 (0.014) *** -0.135 (0.014) *** -0.129 (0.013) ***
State dummies YES YES YES YES
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 30070 30070 30070 22924
R-squared 0.579 0.579 0.587 0.589
F-statistics 227.21 225.31 213.54 180.21
(1) (4)(2) (3)
Note: Same as in Table 3. 
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Table 5 Regression Results for Skill Sorting 
sample
dependent
variable
leontief -11.888 -12.189 -9.273 -12.793 *** -13.461 *** -10.994 ** -9.014 -6.628 0.074
(7.169) (9.143) (11.492) (4.479) (4.609) (4.167) (7.736) (9.607) (11.670)
bpleon -0.756 *** -1.062 *** -1.437 ***
(0.095) (0.098) (0.088)
bpbtw -0.657 -1.092 ** -1.654 **
(0.414) (0.514) (0.624)
constant 36.388 *** 46.111 *** 56.258 *** 62.403 *** 82.673 *** 105.726 *** 52.583 *** 71.513 *** 92.968 ***
(12.852) (16.391) (20.601) (8.664) (8.916) (8.060) (17.547) (21.790) (26.469)
Number of
observations
42 42 42 42 42 42 41 41 41
R-squared 0.064 0.043 0.016 0.644 0.763 0.874 0.111 0.131 0.160
F-statistics 2.75 1.78 0.65 35.3 62.77 135.23 2.36 2.86 3.63
Prov >F 0.105 0.190 0.425 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.108 0.069 0.036
sample
dependent
variable
leontief -23.330 *** -27.530 *** -29.633 ** -9.881 * -8.109 -3.071 -23.037 *** -24.837 ** -23.354 *
(7.565) (9.499) (11.710) (5.680) (5.690) (4.754) (8.403) (10.280) (12.208)
bpleon -0.844 *** -1.219 *** -1.667 ***
(0.134) (0.135) (0.113)
bpbtw -0.618 -1.039 ** -1.587 ***
(0.388) (0.475) (0.564)
constant 59.183 *** 76.665 *** 96.805 *** 59.470 *** 77.080 *** 97.371 *** 79.061 *** 105.829 *** 137.194 ***
(13.909) (17.465) (21.530) (9.672) (9.690) (8.096) (18.178) (22.238) (26.411)
Number of
observations
38 38 38 38 38 38 37 37 37
R-squared 0.209 0.189 0.151 0.628 0.757 0.883 0.263 0.278 0.293
F-statistics 9.51 8.4 6.4 29.56 54.62 132.44 6.06 6.54 7.05
Prov >F 0.004 0.006 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.004 0.003
A. All industries
B. Manufacturing and service industries
gradwin
(1)
hswin
(2)
swin
(3)
gradwin
(4)
gradwin
(7)
hswin
(8)
hswin
(5)
swin
(6)
swin
(9)
gradwin hswin swin gradwin hswin swin gradwin hswin swin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of high-skilled workers (gradwin =graduate and above, 
hswin = higher secondary and above, swin = secondary and above) in industry j. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively 
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Appendix I. Data Sources and Construction of Variables Used in the Analysis 
Data / Variable Sources / Construction method 
wage Source: NSSO, Unit-level data of National Sample Survey, Employment 
and Unemployment schedule, 1999-00 [NSS 1999]. 
Weekly wage and salary earnings (received or receivable, including 
bonus and perquisites, expressed in terms of Indian Rupees) are for 
full-time economic activities, which are those done for at least 5 days, 
during the reference week. They include both in-cash and in-kind 
earnings. Wages and salary in kind are valuated at the current retail price 
by the NSSO. In the NSS, it is considered working for a half day if an 
individual has worked for 1 hour or more but less than 4 hours in a day. If 
an individual has worked for 4 hours or more, it is considered working 
for a full day. This information is used to compute the number of working 
days.  
Only samples of male, prime-age (15-65), regular salaried/wage 
employees who have worked at least 5 days at their main economic 
activity during the reference week are used in the regression analyses. 
 
age Source: NSS 1999. 
Individual i’s age. 
 
eduy Source: NSS 1999. 
Years of education, which are estimated from the highest general 
education level attained by individual i, are determined by allocating the 
following number of years of schooling to each level: illiterate (0 years), 
literate without formal schooling or literate but below primary (2.5 
years), primary (5 years), middle (8 years), secondary (10 years), higher 
secondary (12 years), graduate and above (16 years). 
 
leontief Sources: Input-Output Transaction Table of 1998-99 and 1993-94 (CSO, 
2000, 2005). [India IO 1998, 1993] 
jLeontief , which is the column sum of the Leontief inverse coefficient of 
industry j, is computed as follows: 
∑= k kjj leonLeontief , 
where is the Leontief inverse coefficient in cell kj. Subscripts k 
and j denote row and column of the IO table, respectively. The Leontief 
inverse coefficient matrix L comprised of k * j s is computed as  
kjleon
kjleon
1)( −−= dAIL , 
where I is the identity matrix;  is the input coefficient matrix for 
domestic inputs, in which the coefficient in cell kj is the domestic input in 
cell kj divided by the output of industry j. Since the India IO 1998 does 
not contain an import flow matrix, the values of domestic and imported 
inputs are estimated by using IO 1993 which contains an import flow 
matrix. It is assumed that the share of imported input for each column j in 
the total import is unchanged from 1993 to 1998. For more details on 
computation, see the Appendix I of Asuyama (2011). 
dA
 
bpleon Sources: NSS 1999, and India IO 1998, 1993. 
For the definition and construction of the index, see Section 4 in the main 
text. 
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bpbtw Sources: NSS 1999, and India IO 1998, 1993. 
For the definition and construction of index, see Section 4 in the main 
text. 
 
bpwin Source: NSS 1999. 
For the definition and construction of index, see Section 4 in the main 
text. 
 
imported input Sources: India IO 1998, 1993. 
The ratio of imported input is calculated for each industry as the 
percentage of the value of imported inputs to the value of total inputs, 
using the IO tables of India. Import values are estimated as in the above 
explanation of Leontief. 
 
Import Sources: India IO 1998. 
An industry’s ratio of final good import is defined as 
[import/(output+import-export)]*100(%). 
 
export Sources: India IO 1998. 
An industry’s ratio of final good export is defined as 
[export/output]*100(%). 
 
delicensed Sources: Aghion et al., (2008) and Handbook of Industrial Policy and 
Statistics 2001 (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2002). 
A binary variable that equals one if industry j is still covered under 
compulsory industrial licensing which was stipulated in the Industries 
(Development and Regulation) Act of 1951, and zero otherwise. Only 
industry 7 (tobacco) is coded as one.  
 
private 
 
Sources: “Statement on Industrial Policy, July 24, 1991” by the Ministry 
of Industry, Government of India and Handbook of Industrial Policy and 
Statistics 2001 (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2002). 
A binary variable that equals one if industry j is not reserved for the 
public sector, and zero if reserved for that sector. Only industries 32 
(railway transport) and 42 (public administration) are coded as one. 
 
FDI 
 
Sources: Aghion et al., (2008) and Handbook of Industrial Policy and 
Statistics 2001 (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2002). 
A binary variable that equals one if industry j is partly (in terms of some 
sub-industry level) or entirely opened to automatic approval of FDI for 
up to 51 percent equity or more, and zero otherwise. 
 
muslim 
 
Source: NSS 1999. 
A binary variable that equals one if individual i’s religion is Islam, and 
zero otherwise. 
 
SG (ST, SC, OBC, 
Other) 
Source: NSS 1999. 
Dummy variables that indicate to which social group individual i 
belongs. ST is scheduled tribe, SC is scheduled caste, OBC is other 
backward class, and Other is other social groups. 
 
household head Source: NSS 1999. 
A binary variable that equals one if individual i is the head of the 
household, and zero otherwise. 
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married Source: NSS 1999. 
A binary variable that equals one if individual i is currently married, and 
zero otherwise. 
 
temporary Source: NSS 1999. 
A binary variable that equals one if individual i’s nature of employment is 
temporary, and zero if permanent. 
 
union Source: NSS 1999. 
A binary variable that equals one if individual i is a member of a 
union/association, and zero otherwise. 
 
occ (1-11) Source: NSS 1999. 
Dummy variables that indicate individual i‘s occupation. Figures in the 
parenthesis below indicate NCO-1968 code. 
occ1: Professionals. (00, 02, 05, 07, 10-14, 150, 16-19) 
occ2: Technicians etc. (01, 03, 04, 06, 08, 09, 151-156, 159) 
occ3: Government administrative & executive officials (20, 21, 31) 
occ4: Managers (22-30) 
occ5: Clerical and related workers (3) 
occ6: Sales workers (4) 
occ7: Service workers (5) 
occ8: Farmers, fishermen, hunters, loggers, and related workers (6) 
occ9: Production and related workers, transport equipment operators and 
laborers: supervisors & foremen (Among 71-98, all three-digit codes 
ending with zero (e.g. 710, 720, 730, ... 980) 
occ10: Production and related workers, transport equipment operators 
and laborers: other than supervisors & foremen (7-9 except for those 
recorded as occ9) 
occ11: Not classified (X) 
 
public firm Source: NSS 1999. 
A binary variable that equals one if the enterprise for which individual i is 
working is either a public or semi-public type, and zero otherwise. 
 
small firm Source: NSS 1999. 
A binary variable that equals one if the number of workers of the 
enterprise for which individual i is working is less than 10, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
rural Source: NSS 1999. 
A binary variable that equals one if individual i’s area of residence is 
rural, and zero if urban. 
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Appendix II. Industry Classification 
IO 1998 (IO code) NSS 1999 (NIC-1998 code)
1 Agriculture 1-17, 19, 20 01
2 Forestry & logging 21 02
3 Fishing 23 05
4 Mining & quarrying 23-32 10-14
5 Food 18, 33-38 151-154
6 Bevarage 39 155
7 Tobacco 40 16
8 Textile 41-47, 49 17
9 Wearing apparel 48 181
10 Wooden furniture 50 36101
11 Wood and wood products 51 20
12 Paper, paper products & newsprint 52 21
13 Printing & publishing 53 221, 222
14 Leather footwear 54 192
15 Leather and leather products 55 191, 182
16 Rubber products 56 251
17 Plastic products 57 252
18 Petroleum & coal tar products 58, 59 23
19 Chemical products 60-68 24
20 Non-metallic mineral products 69-71 26
21 Iron and steel 72-74 271, 273
22 Non-ferrous basic metals 75 272
23
Industrial machinery, machine tools,
fabricated metal products
76-81, 83 28, 291, 292
24
Office computing machines, communication
equipment, electronic equipment (incl. TV)
82, 88, 90 30, 32
25 Electrical industrial machinery 84 311, 312
26 Electrical machinery and apparatus (wire,
cable, batteries, electric appliances)
85-87, 89 293, 313-315, 319
27 Motor vehicles 93 34
28 Other transport equipment (excl. aircraft) 91, 92, 94-96 351, 352, 359
29 Miscellaneous manufacturing (incl. watches
and clocks, medical instruments, aircraft)
97, 98 331-333, 353, 361(excluding 36101), 369
30 Construction 99 45
31 Electricity, gas and water 100-102 40, 41
32 Transport (railway) 103 601
33 Transport (other), storage 104, 105 602, 603, 61-63
34 Post & telecommunication 106 64
35 Trade (wholesale and retail) 107 50-52
36 Hotels and restaurants 108 55
37 Banking 109 65, 67
38 Insurance 110 66
39 Education and research 112 73, 80
40 Medical and health 113 851, 852
41 Other services (RE, BusiServ, ComputerServ,
Renting, Community, Other)
111, 114 70-72, 74, 853, 90-93, 95, 99
42 Public administration , defence 115 75  
Notes: The above classification of 42 industries is designed so that the content of the industries between 
the IO table data and NSS 1999 data is matched. In order to obtain reliable data on within-industry skill 
distribution, the number of samples for employed persons extracted from NSS 1999 is kept to at least 
around 100 in each industry. 
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